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1. Introduction  
In occupational safety one of the most complicated and harder to achieve goals is to 
prioritize actions towards risk prevention and mitigation. There are several methodologies 
to do that. Some of them are expensive; demand some extensive structure for its application 
and so on. Some others are either weak in results or lack technical or scientific basis. 
(Haddad et al, 2008). The research presented in this chapter emerged in between these 
methodologies for being not expensive and requiring resources, most of the time, already 
available in a company’s documentation. 
More specifically, this chapter focuses on the development and usage of a risk assessment 
methodology called Hazard Matrix (HM) and its application in Health, Safety and 
Environmental Management (HSE). The HM is a prioritization methodology suitable to be 
used in the analysis phase of a risk management program. The application of HM in HSE is 
a very powerful methodology to highlight critical hazards and sectors/areas in a business 
unit or company under study.  
We will present and explore the HM concept, features, relevance and implementation, 
under the scope of a risk management process. In order to achieve this, the chapter will 
follow this sequence, organized in sections:  
 HSE aims and structure (Section 2); 
 Aspects of risk management necessary for a HSE Program (Section 3); 
 The HM concept, structure and applications;  (Section 4) 
 Two case studies for the clarification of the methodology and to highlight its 
possibilities of use (Section 5). 
The case studies presented come from two different types of industries, in order to 
demonstrate the comprehensive application of HM and details. Although the methodology 
lacks a refined or complex mathematical structure, we can refine the presented approach 
and develop other implementations leading to a high detailed usage. Here we refrain to do 
that; this is something for future work. 
2. HSE aims and structure 
Basically, HSE deals with the anticipation and recognition, analysis, evaluation, treatment 
and communication of hazards and treats in the occupational safety aspect of any company, 
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and by an expanded or more comprehensive perspective, to all surrounding environments. 
HSE is becoming increasingly important, as well as demanded, in any company’s effort 
towards sustainability and legal adequacy. It is becoming part of its regular operations and 
is commonly required by regulatory bodies, clients and society. 
In order to organize a HSE Program one needs to develop and structure (ISO 14.001:2007, 
2007) a set of activities in a close relation with a Risk Management Program (ISO 31.000:2009, 
2009). Determination of scope and objectives are necessary for the establishment of such a Risk 
Management Program. In this phase, each step of this management process must be defined, 
as well as its expected results. After that, the mapping of all organization’s processes and also 
their interactions must be performed (the ones that interfere in risk management). On this 
phase of the HSE effort, all activities, operations and the relations between them must be 
clearly identified, as they represent potential sources of hazard. Moreover, in order to achieve 
enough knowledge to underlie adequate action of HSE process, data must be collected from 
the activities and operations, about its Processes (inputs and outputs), its People who work 
there, and generally about the Organization itself.  
After data collection and the processes mapping are done, the management process is able 
to perform a Hazard Mapping and Identification, which consists in identification, 
localization and classification of the hazards involved in each process activities of the 
organization. This classification is performed according to two aspects: type of hazard 
existent, such as physical, chemical, biological etc., and the severity of its impact. The second 
one is traduced mathematically by weights that can be represented in a boarding selection. 
After these entire actions have been performed one can establish the necessary set of 
information in order to develop the HM (Haddad et al, 2008) application in the next 
stage. With the sequential implementation of the concepts and tools listed one should be 
able to apply these concepts, use the HM, recognize and prioritize risks, and implement 
a useful tool in the development of a Risk Management Program addressing HSE issues.   
3. Aspects of risk management necessary for a HSE program  
System Safety can be described as a sub-discipline of systems engineering that applies 
scientific, engineering and management principles to ensure adequate safety, the timely 
identification of hazard risk, and initiation of actions to prevent or control those hazards 
throughout the life cycle and within the constraints of operational effectiveness, time, and 
cost (Vincoli, 2006). 
One of the key aspects of safety management is the proper management of risk. There are 
several ways of defining risk, but all of them share a common core: they define risk as 
combination of its independent variables likelihood and severity. The new ISO 31.000:2009, 
entitled “Risk Management”, presents a series of guidelines and principles for its 
management. ISO 31.000:2009 defines risk as: 
“Risk - effect of uncertainty on objectives 
NOTE 1 an effect is a deviation from the expected — positive and/or negative. 
NOTE 2 Objectives can have different aspects (such as financial, health and safety, and 
environmental goals) and can apply at different levels (such as strategic, organization-wide, project, 
product and process). 
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NOTE 3 Risk is often characterized by reference to potential events and consequences), or a 
combination of these. 
NOTE 4 Risk is often expressed in terms of a combination of the consequences of an event (including 
changes in circumstances) and the associated likelihood of occurrence. 
NOTE 5 Uncertainty is the state, even partial, of deficiency of information related to, understanding 
or knowledge of an event, its consequence, or likelihood”  
The concept of risk indicates that it relates to activities or tasks to be performed, being 
intimately related to a human behavior or environment. As an example, a fuel, such as 
gasoline, isolated from its context, does not present any level of risk by itself. However, 
when this fuel is considered to be handled at an environment where sources of ignition are 
present, for example, dealing with gasoline becomes a hazardous activity. The associated 
risk will vary according to the behavior of the handler and environmental where it is done. 
As stated by (Ciocoiu and Dobrea 2010) “even apparently insignificant risks have the 
potential, as they interact with other events and conditions, to cause great damage. “ 
Due to the very nature of risk, it is present in almost every activity, job or task performed in 
the modern world. The accelerating pace of business, globalization, the financial crisis, all 
contribute to the growing number and complexity of risks and to the greater responsibility 
for managing risks on an enterprise-wide scale (Ciocoiu and Dobrea, 2010). This leads to the 
need of managing occupational risks ahead in order to assure minimum casualties and 
optimum performance. However, the risk is also a very complex entity, which directs to 
difficulties when understanding and managing. 
It is commonly accepted that a proper method for assessing and managing risks pass 
through decomposing the “risk” in its independent variables: frequency, severity, and 
scenario. Therefore, the dependent variable “Risk” can be written as: 
Risk = f (frequency, severity, scenario) 
Decomposing the risk in independent variables and further analyzing each variable is the 
core method presented in the MIL STD 882 for preliminary Hazard analysis. This concept 
has proved to be successful , since it is still used by many standards, including the forth 
review of MIL STD 882 (United States, 2003), OHSAS 18.001:2007 (OHSAS, 2007) and ISO 
31.000:2009 (ISO, 2009) 
3.1 The risk management process 
Before human’s development of risk management process and the clear concept of system 
safety, the common technique used to deal with risk was mainly based on a trial and error 
approach. This culture led mankind to fix problems only after its consequences were 
observed at the already designed running system. In opposition, the idea of minimizing 
risks until acceptable levels by trying to predict the occurrence of accidents and taking 
measures in order to avoid them is widely diffused nowadays. This approach characterizes 
the concept of risk management. 
Risk management can be defined as the collection of culture, processes and structures that 
are directed towards realizing potential opportunities whilst managing adverse effects 
(Australia, 2004). In this context, it is a complex process and can be understood as a 
systematic application of management policies, procedures and practices. 
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The NZS 4360:2004 guideline (AUSTRALIA, 2004) determines that a proper overall risk 
management process incorporates several other tasks, such as: 
 Communication, 
 Identification, 
 Analysis, 
 Evaluation, 
 Treatment, 
 Monitoring; and  
 Reviewing. 
The ISO 31.000:2009, in its turn, defines risk management as: 
“Risk management: 
process of systematic application of management policies, procedures and practices to the activities of 
communicating, consulting, establishing the context, and identifying, analyzing, evaluating, 
treating, monitoring and reviewing risk”  
Fig.  presents an overview of the entire risk management process, based upon the process 
described in the NZS 4360:2004 guideline (Australia, 2004), using a block diagram 
representation. 
 
Fig. 1. Risk Management overview (based on ISO 31000: 2009) 
At this point, it is important to highlight that the success of risk treatment depends directly 
on how complete its preliminary analysis, which identifies, describes and classifies them. 
Risk identification of any organization requires the previous knowledge of its activities and 
processes, of the external market conjuncture and the legal, social, political and cultural 
environment in which the company is inserted, and for that, it must be clearly defined its 
strategic objectives (Muniz, 2011). 
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Within the risk management, which is an interactive process where the risk is studied again 
after all the mitigations are in place (as indicated by the arrow linking “treat risk” and 
“monitoring and review” in figure 01), one major phase in the overall process is assess the 
risk. The Australian and New Zealand Standards AS NZS 4360:2004 defines that this phase 
comprehends: Identify the risk, analyze the risk and evaluate the risk, and defines its steps 
as follow:  
 Risk analysis: systematic process to understand the nature of the risk and deduce its 
level; 
 Risk identification: the process of determining what, where, when, why and how 
something could happen: 
 Risk evaluation: the process of comparing the level of risk. In many cases the risk 
evaluation involves establish a priority among several risks. 
Furthermore, due to resources limitation, which is unavoidable, addressing all indentified 
risks becomes a non-realistic approach. As resources can be limited financially, 
technically, or even related to time or personnel, one will need to implement a system to 
highlight the most critical hazards and sectors, so that appropriate resources application 
can be assured. The important role of a prioritization system highlighted above is 
efficiently accomplished by HM, since its main objective is to establish a priority ranking 
among risks and sectors. 
3.1.1 The importance of prioritization  
Companies have one primary goal: profit. This is the reason for their existence and thus 
almost all decisions taken at business environment unavoidably aim at profits increase 
(Mello, 2004). In this context, hazard minimization and mainly the prevention and 
mitigation of its consequences must be established in a systemic and optimized way.  
As it is clear that any company works with limited resources, there ought to be a 
prioritization tool able to identify such as which risks or company’s sectors are more critical, 
on which the plan of risks mitigation can be based and oriented. Therefore, the best 
utilization of financial, labor or time resources can be assured. 
In this context, must be emphasized that there are many aspects in which prioritization 
can be established. It can be financial aspect, so that more money is spent on the priority 
issue and it is assigned a larger proportion of the available budget. Alternatively, 
‘priority’ may be temporally defined, as all risk issues cannot be tackled simultaneously. 
An identified priority issue would thus be address in precedence to another, which may 
be deferred until a later time. Temporal prioritization is fundamental to the development 
of long-term strategic risk management plans. (Centre for Environmental & Risk 
Management, 1997) 
Situated right between the Evaluation and the Treatment phases at Risk Management 
Process, described by Figure 1, risks prioritization becomes a strategic part of this process 
when it is taken for its real application, since, after risk analysis and evaluation, it is possible 
that resources limitations naturally lead to a necessary chose of more critical measures to be 
taken at a first moment, as well as demand a temporal ordination. 
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Further, studying risk management, one can conclude that risk prioritization is a key aspect 
of the overall procedure. As risk prioritization and treatment are intrinsically connected to 
risk analysis and evaluation, the next section briefly presents and discusses methods 
commonly used to evaluate risks. 
3.2 Risk evaluation schemes 
In the risk management process one important aspect is the risk analysis, which is done 
using a chosen methodology, which is sometimes called “risk assessment scheme”. 
Despite the fact that Hammer’s book (reference) is an old reference, it still is quoted and 
cited in many recent works and manuals of risk assessment, due to its clear ideas and 
concepts. Although the risk assessment schemes presented by Hammer might be somehow 
obsolete, the concepts are not. 
There are an unlimited number of schemes. Each one has its strengths and weakness. 
Hammer, in his book, presents several possible schemes, which can be folded into 4 greater 
categories: 
 Analysis in trees 
 Analysis in spreadsheets 
 Qualitative Analysis 
 Quantitative Analysis 
It is important to remark that every risk assessment method will fall into two of the four 
categories. A risk assessment tool will be qualitative or quantitative and formatted as tree or 
spread sheet. This leads to a classification matrix as shown in Table 1. 
 
 Analysis formatted as tree 
Analysis formatted as Spread 
Sheet 
Qualitative Results   
Quantitative Results   
Table 1. Risk Assessment – Classification Table 
The schemes of risk analysis under the tree concept focus on establishing a chain of events, as 
well as assess the risk occurrence likelihood. The TNO Red Book (Committee For The 
Prevention of Disasters, 1997) presents some fault tree analysis methods. Risk assessment 
performed using fault trees technique can provide a result as simple as a series of causes and 
effects (qualitative approach) or as complex as the evaluation of risk occurrence probability 
(quantitative approach). It is also important to remark that the analysis complexity varies at 
the same rate as the analyzed system complexity. 
The other category of risk assessment is the spreadsheet. Some of the most used risk 
assessment schemes fall into the spreadsheet category. This category counts widely used 
methods like HazOp (Committee For The Prevention of Disasters, 1997), FMEA (United 
States. MIL-STD-1629, 2000), Hazard Preliminary Analysis (HPA) (United States, MIL-STD 
882-D, 2003) and the HAZARD MATRIX (Haddad, 2008). 
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The majority of the risk schemes available approach the problem using the principle of 
compartmentalization, studying sub-systems and sub-components, on behalf of simplicity 
in more complex systems.  
This “compartmentalization” is done setting borders in the scenario. These borders can set 
sub-areas for analysis, sub–system, and sub-component or split the “target” of the analysis 
using nodes. The main representative tool of this technique that places nods in the flow of 
matter and energy flows and analyze the risks in each nod is the HazOp. (Committee For 
The Prevention of Disasters, 1997), 
Irrespective of the chosen method to assess risk, a quantitative analysis is to be preferred 
over any qualitative, mainly because a quantitative approach establishes a hierarchy 
between risks. The HM is an example of a risk assessment method designed to prioritize 
risks, hazards and environmental (sectors). 
In summary, the risk assessment schemes should be selected matching the strengths and 
weakness of each scheme with a given scenario and the output requirements: 
 HazOP - This scheme suite perfectly a scenario where the productive process can be 
represented (drawn) as a flow chart, due to the easiness of cutting the flow applying 
nods on it. It is known that a block diagram can be used to represent a “flow chart” and, 
therefore, allow application of HazOP to a discontinuous process (such as an 
assembling line), if the level of risk justifies this approach. (Committee For The 
Prevention of Disasters, 1997), 
 FMEA - The FMEA is the risk assessment scheme published by the MIL STD 1629 
(UNITED STATES, 2000) and used spreadsheets to decompose the risk in its failure 
modes, causes and consequences. This FMEA suites best when applied to machinery or 
equipment’s. 
 Tree Analysis - All the assessment methods that fold into this category assess the risk 
by set a chain of events (causes and consequences). These methods regard to determine 
the frequency (number) for the likelihood of the risk to occur. 
 Matrix Schemes - These schemes provide a very flexible approach to the risk and 
hazards analyses. As a general rule, these tools compensate the lack of deep by 
decomposing the risk in its independent variables (likelihood and severity) and 
analyzing each variable separately. These methods are also indicated to assess risk of a 
particular task in hand. The hazard matrix proposed in this chapter is one example of 
this category. 
This section provided an overview about risk management in a general approach. However, 
risk management procedures may differ depending upon scenario and applications. The 
next section addresses the risk management and evaluation when applied specifically to 
environmental risks. 
3.3 Environmental risk management and evaluation 
When it comes to environmental risk, the scenario is a key part of the entire risk assessment 
routine. In general, the hazards identification process is the same for both environmental 
and occupational risk management. The main difference between them will be related to the 
scope utilized to determine the scenario. 
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At his point, considering this risk scenario context, it is important to clearly define a limit 
that, in a simplified way, represents the interface between the industry internal and external 
environment. This limit is well represented by a key concept: the industry walls, which 
defines a separation between occupational and environmental hazards.  
During an occupational risk management process, one is concerned with the effects of the 
hazard within the boundaries of the enterprise, company, unit or industry. This scope 
guides all decisions, from which methodology use to what consequences should be 
neglected. 
On the opposite, the scope applied over the scenario when an environmental risk 
management process is undertaken focus on risks source effects on the external area, which 
means beyond the industry walls. Figure 2 represents the difference between environmental 
and occupational risk management approaches. 
 
Fig. 2. Environmental Risk versus Occupational Risk 
4. The Hazard matrix (HM) concept, structure and applications 
The HM methodology, based on the work done by (Haddad el al 2008), is a valuable tool to 
allow determination of prioritization among several risks, hazards and sectors within a 
given system or environment. This complex system can be anything that held more than a 
single hazard to be prevented or mitigated, from an industry to an office building. 
The HM approach is based on the already cited concept of risk as a function of its severity 
and probability of occurrence. In a simplified view, as seen before, risk can be defined by the 
product of its two variables. In the HM, the probabilistic factor is represented by the number 
of workers exposed to the hazard. The severity factor, in turn, is mathematically traduced by 
a numerical classification of hazards, which will be more specified later.    
The analysis starts by dividing the company in sectors, identifying the hazards and sectors 
its respective sectors of exposure. Due to that, it is likely to use the hazard matrix combined 
with other risk identification and assessment tools, like FMEA (MIL STD 1629) or HPA (MIL 
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STD 882). Each sector constitutes a line (from 1 to y) in the hazard matrix, followed by a 
column that stands for the number of workers on that sector. As for the other columns,  they 
take all the hazards identified in all the sectors, drawing column from 1 to x. 
After building the matrix, the hazards identified are preliminarily assessed though out the 
use of a “Risk Assessment Code” (RAC). This RAC follows a simple criterion, which varies 
according to the scenario, availability of data or even precision required. The important is 
that the criteria must be the same for the entire matrix, as well as be able to provide a 
numerical number. 
When it comes to occupational hazards, one valid criterion is presented (as example) in Table 2. 
 
Risk Assessment 
Code 
Description 
0 This hazard is NOT present in the sector evaluated 
1 
The exposure of this hazard occurs bellow the action level AND 
it is occasional 
3 
The exposure of this hazard occurs bellow the action level AND, 
continuously 
6 
The exposure level is between the action level and the Threshold 
Value Limit (TVL-TWA) or equivalent. 
9 
The exposure level is above Threshold Value Limit (TVL-TWA) 
or equivalent. 
Note: Action level is half the TVL-TWA value 
Table 2. Risk Assessment Codes for Hazardous agents (chemicals, physical or Biological 
agents). 
Therefore, the HM is completed by evaluating the hazards using the RAC pre-selected for a 
given scenario. Each given position within the matrix corresponds to the hazard in a given 
sector. That means that the value written in the position (i,j) stands for the RAC () which 
best represents the exposure to the Hazard “j” faced by the workers in sector “i". 
In the HM, the Sectors (S) and Number of Workers (W) forms the lines and the hazards (H) 
the columns that draws the borders of the RAC. Table 3 presents a general HM.   
 
Sector Hazards identified
Description / 
Name 
Number of people 
working 
H1 H2 H3 … Hx 
S1 W1 R1,1 R1,2 R1,3 … R1,X 
S2 W2 R2,1 R2,2 R2,3 … R2,X 
S3 W3 R3,1 R3,2 R3,3 … R3,X 
… … … … …  … 
SY WY RY,1 RY,2 RY,3 … RY,X 
Table 3. Hazard Matrix – General Construction model 
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The next stage of the HM approach is to calculate the hazard frequency of recurrence, the 
exposure frequency and the relevancy percentage. 
The hazard frequency of recurrence measures how intense is the overall exposure to a given 
risk, while the exposure frequency evaluates which sector represents a more hazardous 
environmental to work in. Both frequencies take into account the number of works exposed 
and the intensity of the hazard. 
The relevancy percentages are a mathematical composition of both hazard frequency of 
recurrence and exposure frequency to allow easier understanding and prioritization. Next, 
we present the hazard frequency calculation in more details.  
4.1 Hazard frequency calculation 
Taking the first Hazard (H1) in the matrix (Table ), its hazard frequency of recurrence is 
determined by the following calculation: 
1 1 1,1 2 2,1 3 3,1 ,1* * * ... *H y yf W R W R W R W R      
Similar calculations are performed to all the other hazards to determine their hazard 
recurrence frequency: 
2 1 1,2 2 2,2 3 3,2 ,2
3 1 1,3 2 2,3 3 3,3 ,3
1 1, 2 2, 3 3, ,
* * * ... *
* * * ... *
* * * ... *
H y y
H y y
Hx x x x y y x
f W R W R W R W R
f W R W R W R W R
f W R W R W R W R
    
    
    
 
This allows the establishment of a general rule for determining the recurrence frequency of 
any hazard within a HM as follows: 
,
1
*
y
Hj i i j
i
f W R

 , 
where 
 1 j  x  
After all the hazard recurrence frequencies are determined, a global hazard frequency can 
be determined as follows:  
FH  fHj
j1
x  
The global hazard frequency is used to calculate the relevancy percentages. The other key figure 
of a hazard matrix is the exposure frequency, which is further presented in the next section. 
4.2 Exposure frequency calculation 
Following the determination of all the hazard recurrence frequencies, comes the 
determination of the exposure frequencies. Taking the first sector (S1) in the HM (Table ???) 
the exposure frequency is determined as follows: 
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1 1 1,1 1 1,2 1 1,* * ... *s xf W R W R W R     
The other exposure frequencies are determined using similar equations: 
2 2 2,1 2 2,2 2 2,
3 3 3,1 3 3,2 3 3,
,1 ,2 ,
* * ... *
* * ... *
* * ... *
s x
s x
sy y y y y y y x
f W R W R W R
f W R W R W R
f W R W R W R
   
   
   
 
Analyzing the method to determine each exposure frequency, it is possible to determine a 
general rule for their determination: 
,
1
*
x
si i i j
j
f W R

  
, where 
 1 i  y  
The global exposure frequency is determined as follows:  
1
y
S si
i
F f

  
Similarly to the global hazard frequency, the global exposure frequency will also be used to 
calculate the relevancy percentages.  This is done next.   
4.3 Relevancy percentage calculation 
The next stage of the hazard matrix method is determining the relevancy percentage , which 
can be calculated via  the following set of equations: 
%Hj  fHj
FH
*100 
Wi *Ri, j
i1
y
fHj
i1
x
*100 ,  
where 
1 j  x , 
,
1
1
*
% * 100 * 100
x
i i j
jsi
si y
s
si
i
W R
f
F
f


 


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where 
 1 i  y  
With these calculations performed, we are ready to assemble the entire HM. This is 
discussed next.  
4.4 The complete hazard matrix 
Once all the calculations are concluded, the HM from Table 3 can be updated to incorporate 
these percentages. Table 4  Hazard Matrix – Relevancy Percentages presents this newer and 
complete matrix.  
5. Hazard matrix applications in HSE 
Like risk management, hazard matrix application also varies depending upon scenario and 
scope of analyses. This section addresses these differences and customization required when 
one applies HM to HSE as well as other applications. 
 
Sector 
Hazards 
identified
  
Description / 
Name 
Number of 
people 
working 
H1 H2 H3 … Hx   
S1 W1 R1,1 R1,2 R1,3 … R1,X fs1 %s1 
S2 W2 R2,1 R2,2 R2,3 … R2,X fS,2 %S,2 
S3 W3 R3,1 R3,2 R3,3 … R3,X fS3 %S3 
… … … … …  … … … 
SY WY RY,1 RY,2 RY,3 … RY,X fSY %SY 
 fH1 fH2 fH3 fHx  
 %H1 %H2 %H3 %Hx 100% 
Table 4. Hazard Matrix – Relevancy Percentages 
5.1 Environmental risks prioritization 
The main difference between applying the HM to prioritize occupational hazards and 
environmental hazards is the understanding of the scenario. As already discussed in 
figure 2, one addressing the occupational hazards will analyze risk, frequencies and 
exposure within the boundaries of an enterprise, Industry or site, while the 
environmental risk assessment will regard the effects on the exterior of this same 
enterprise. 
Hence, in cases on which the HM is intended to be applied to prioritize and assess 
environmental risks, some small adaptations are due. 
Firstly, the sectors of an enterprise will be replaced to vulnerable areas already identified on 
the neighborhood (or areas of influence) of a given enterprise, industry or unit. 
Subsequently, the number of workers will be replaced by an average number of people 
living / working in that given vulnerable areas. Secondly, the hazards identified will 
concern to risks that can create effects outside the enterprise, industry or unit boundaries. 
From these adaptations, the environmental HM is adapted as shown in table 5. 
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Vulnerable 
area 
Hazards 
identified 
  
Description / 
Name 
Number of 
people 
Living / 
working 
H1 H2 H3 … Hx   
A1 P1 R1,1 R1,2 R1,3 … R1,X fs1 %s1 
A2 P2 R2,1 R2,2 R2,3 … R2,X fS,2 %S,2 
A3 P3 R3,1 R3,2 R3,3 … R3,X fS3 %S3 
… … … … …  … … … 
AY PY RY,1 RY,2 RY,3 … RY,X fSY %SY 
 fH1 fH2 fH3  fHx   
 %H1 %H2 %H3  %Hx  100% 
Table 5. Environmental Hazard Matrix 
Thirdly, the risk levels need to be re-designed to match environmental events. Due to the 
complexity of assess effects and predict damages, it is recommended to keep the description 
of environmental risks as simple as possible. Table 6 presents one suitable example. 
 
Risk 
Assessment 
Code 
Description 
0 This hazard is NOT percept in that given vulnerable area 
1 
This Hazard can damage the environment in a reparable way, 
without any permanent damage to structures, environmental or 
people, and without victims. 
3 
This Hazards can severely damage the environmental and harm 
people, without loss of lives 
9 
This hazard can cause immediate death of at least one person 
within the vulnerable area 
Table 6. Environmental Risk Assessment Codes, based upon MIL STD 882 Severity 
categories. 
The mathematical determination of the hazard frequency, exposure frequency, relevancy 
percentages remains the same as presented in the section 3. 
This section presented an application of the Hazard Matrix tool to Environmental Risk 
Analysis. However, HM is a valuable tool for other scenarios as well. One example of such 
application of HM is in project management, which is further explored in the next section. 
5.2 Projects/temporal applications 
One of the most useful and enriching results of a Risk Prioritization tool, which specially 
includes the HM, is the global and comparative view of the organization’s sectors (as well as 
their interactions) that it provides. Nevertheless, some productive sectors, such as the 
Construction Industry, have its operation based on projects, where the final product is the 
main goal of the production activities, which are finished when the product is completed.  
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Such kind of activities, in terms of risk assessment and prioritization, may demand a specific 
approach, in order to provide to project’s managers its global understanding and the 
associated risks related to each temporal stage, as well as their interactions along time and 
its effects on the project. 
In this context, in order to meet such demands, a convenient adaptation of HM is 
suggestively developed. Initially, the SECTOR column will be replaced by a STAGE 
column, where will be allocated each stage of the project. Alternatively, it is quite 
acceptable to create sub-stages, if it seems applicable. The probabilistic factor continues to 
be well represented by the number of employees who is going to be involved with each 
stage. 
It is important to emphasize that these analysis do not intent to replace the objectives and 
results of conventional HM, but it only provides, when it is possible and convenient, a 
different and complementary view of the whole process in a temporal approach. Therefore, 
the combined use of both types is quite possible. 
6. Case studies 
In this section, two study cases are presented. Each of the cases of study deals with a 
different aspect and application of the hazard matrix method.  
6.1 Chemical process unit 
Urbanski (1964) and (Meyer 1977) present a method to produce lead azide via precipitation 
using lead nitrate and sodium azide as reactants. This method is largely used in the 
explosive industry, been lead azide is a chemical compound with explosives properties and 
largely used as a primer explosive (payload of blasting caps) in mining activities. Due to its 
(lead azide) explosive properties, “explosion” is expected to be the most relevant hazard. 
However, the hazard matrix method proves that “perception” alone is not a suitable risk 
assessment technique. 
Since lead azide manufacture involves chemical compounds, the RAC (Risk assessment 
codes) should take into account the threshold exposure limits as a parameter. Table 7 
presents the RAC used in this case of study. 
 
  Risk Assessment Codes  
  
9 
 
TVL-TWA   
  
6 
 
Action Level   
  3  
  1  
  0  
Table 7. RAC for a chemical process unit 
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Taking the work done by (Galante 2008), in which a hazard matrix methodology was 
applied to this very kind of manufactory, a hazard matrix for a lead azide unit can be 
written as in table 8. 
 
SECTOR HAZARDS   
Description 
Number of 
Workers 
Exposure 
to 
Chemicals 
(Lead 
salts) 
Physical 
Hazard - 
Noise 
Accident - 
Explosion 
Accident – 
Electrical 
Discharge
Fs %s 
Pb(NO3)2 preparation 
workshop 
2 9 1 0 1 22 23% 
Na(OH) preparation 
workshop 
2 0 1 0 1 4 4% 
Na(N3) preparation 
workshop 
2 0 1 0 1 4 4% 
Precipitation reaction 
workshop 
4 6 1 3 1 44 46% 
Drying 2 3 1 6 1 22 23% 
 Fh 48 12 24 12   
 %H 50% 12.5% 25% 12.5%  100% 
Table 8. Hazard Matrix for Lead Azide manufactory 
Analyzing the results achieved by calculating the hazard matrix, it is possible to prioritize 
the sector and the hazards using the relevance percentage: 
Sectors: 
Precipitation reaction workshop – 46% 
Pb(NO3)2 preparation workshop – 23% 
Drying – 23% 
Na(OH) preparation workshop – 4% 
Na(N3) preparation workshop  – 4% 
Hazards: 
Exposure to Chemicals (Lead salts) – 50% 
Accident – Explosion – 25% 
Physical Hazard – Noise – 12.5% 
Accident – Electrical Discharge – 12.5% 
From the analysis, it is possible to conclude that the most relevant hazard is related to deal 
with lead salts. This relates to the toxicity of lead and its effects once within the human 
body. Since the exposure to lead involves more people, it got a higher relevance percentage, 
which differs from the “initial guess” that “explosion” would be the most relevant hazard. 
As for the sector, the precipitation workshop got the higher relevance, mainly due to the 
higher number or workers in the sector. 
In summary, according to the HM written for this scenario, the top priority when comes to 
mitigate and control hazards would be address the lead exposure (50% of all the hazards 
relevancies are due to lead exposure) in general, and in particular its exposure within the 
precipitation workshop (this area counts for 46% of the exposure relevancies). 
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6.2 Oil Extraction – Offshore platform  
Nowadays modern society and economy is heavily dependent upon oil and its derivatives. 
From that, it is just logical to assume that oil industry is a major player within the 
international economy, being present worldwide, from prospection, extraction and 
processing. At the same time, oils are fuels and by that reason they represent a hazard to be 
managed. Even more, the large amounts of oil dealt with worldwide exponentially increases 
the hazard, both occupational (intense labor, heavy machinery, pumps, chemical hazards, 
fire hazard, and accidents in general.) and environmental (major fires, explosions, major 
leaks both in land and water). 
In a greater scope, there are the oil extraction operations off shore. Extraction platforms 
stationed off shore are one important representative of this group. These platforms are very 
complex installations, being capable to drill and build the oil wells, extract, produce and 
hold both oil and high pressure gases, as well as perform the entire set of required 
maintenances (Freitas et al 2001; Booth and Butler,1992). 
Due to the off shore environment in which oil platform operate and the hazards of its 
operations and products dealt with, as well as economical relevance in modern society, they 
constitute an extremely important scenario for risk assessment, including hazard matrix 
ranking system. Muniz (2011) developed his work having an off-shore oil extraction 
platform as a case of study. The chosen platform is set at the Brazilian coast, near the city of 
Vitoria. 
The work performed by (Muniz 2011), the RAC used were as in table 9 
 
Risk Assessment Code Description 
0 Exposition un-existence 
1 Low level of exposition. 
3 Medium Level of Exposition 
9 High Level of Exposition 
Source: Translated from (Muniz 2011) 
Table 9. Environmental Risk Assessment Codes.   
Using the criteria for RAC as presented in Table 9, (Muniz 2011), it was drawn two hazard 
matrixes, one analyzing a platform in general (Table 10) and a second one analyzing the 
drilling system (Table 11), among others. 
As a complex system, oil extraction platforms in an off-shore environment have a large 
number of areas and hazards to be dealt with. The data presented in Tables 10 and 11 are 
nothing but a small portion of the work developed by (Muniz 2011). Therefore, a HM is a 
remarkable tool to guide the risk assessment process, as well as, the team responsible for 
risk control and mitigation. 
In the early stages of the risk management program, by the use of HM, several hazards can 
be ignored, sectors and areas of lower relevance percentages can be neglected and all the 
effort and resources can be oriented to those hazards and areas that represent the most 
relevant within this vast and complex system. 
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7. Limitations and aspects of hazard matrix 
Since Hazard Matrix is a prioritization tool, as it aims to provide a priority ranking among 
identified hazards and sectors, they must be previously identified and inserted in the HM. 
Therefore, HM utilization in combination with a Risk Identification tool, such as Preliminary 
Hazard Analysis (PHA) is essential. In this sense, failures in the risk identification phase, as 
well as the exclusion of some specific risk or sector identification will certainly jeopardize 
the accuracy and reach of HM prioritization results and global analysis.     
Under the approach of decomposing risk into its independent variables, as discussed earlier, 
HM prioritization of hazards are intrinsically related to the factors severity and probability 
of occurrence. As HM prioritizes the most critical hazards, the ones whose product of 
severity x probability have a high value would be, at a first moment, a priority for the 
treatment phase highlighted by HM. However, at a second moment, after risks mitigation 
under the orientation of HM prioritization is done, hazards whose severity and probability 
were lower initially will appear as priorities in a second HM utilization. The transition 
happens because, during the risk mitigation phase, severity and probability factors of the 
most critical risks are reduced. Consequently, in a second HM utilization, they will not 
appear in the top of priority ranking provided by the method. 
In addition, even though the HM Environmental application provides an efficient 
alternative analysis, one of the most relevant limitations of the methodology is related to the 
difficulty to compare efficiently in prioritization terms both Environmental and 
Occupational risks in the same HM. 
Besides, although HM provides a relative comparison between hazards or sectors that 
ordinates, in percentage, the most critical sectors/hazards to be prioritized, when the 
difference between percentages are very small, the differentiation of relevance between this 
sectors/hazards and its effects on the risks mitigation plans must be analyzed carefully, 
since this numerical analysis is relative. Therefore, in this situation, other factors that 
concern at these sectors/hazards must be evaluated and combined to the HM’s result.  
In this sense, the role of HM alternative applications, such as Project and Environmental 
presented earlier become a useful complementary analysis. By providing an auxiliary view 
of the global situation, they may compensate the conventional HM restrictions and 
limitations such as the ones listed above, reducing the probability of errors. 
8. Closure and future work 
Some future aspects of the application of the HM methodology should be listed as: 1) a 
deeper study in the application of the weights used inside the HM; 2) improvements done in 
the data collection of hazards and sectors, in order to enhance the results achieved (having 
the burden of a higher price of investment) and 3) the development of a better integration 
between risks pertaining the occupational aspect of the analysis (said to be inside the walls) 
and those risks which expose a larger community (said to be outside the walls). 
As it stands, the HM concept and application in HSE is a powerful yet simple form of 
decision making in an occupational risk assessment. It is fully integrated in the Risk 
Management Program of any company. Resources and structure to do this are quite 
commonly already available. 
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The strategic role of a risk prioritization stage at HSE is justified by the inherent limitation of 
resources with which any company works, as well as the difficulty to compare, in a 
relevance scale, predicted accidents. As shown in the first study case, human’s impression of 
risk’s relevance is not a reliable reference to make decisions and prioritize risk mitigation. In 
this context, the utilization of the HM, combined with some risk identification tool, such as 
Hazards Preliminary Analysis (HPA), enables such prioritization, ordering in a critical scale 
both sectors and hazards already identified and classified. 
As there are different applications of HM, it is important to notice that their combined 
utilization with the original HM model is in a complementary approach. Thus, for the HSE of a 
company, for example, there can be developed both an occupational and an environmental 
Hazard Matrix. However, comparison between both environmental and occupational risks, in 
order to orient the prioritization of risk mitigation plans is still a challenge. 
One may say that HM is the chosen method to prioritize risks and to determine strategic 
resources utilization within risk management. However, HM approach and effects 
transcend the mere aspect of risk prioritization: It must be considered as an efficient, global 
and multidisciplinary analysis, connected to plenty aspects of risk management, 
optimization and resources utilization.  
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